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                                                             Abstract 
 
Dictatorship is the predominant political system in many developing countries. However, 
different dictators act quite differently: a good dictator implements growth-enhancing 
economic policies, e.g. investment in public education and infrastructure, whereas a bad 
dictator expropriates wealth of her citizens for her own consumption. The present paper 
provides a theoretical model by deriving underlying determinants of dictatorial behavior. We 
assume that the engine of economic growth is private investment. It can increase the 
productivity of individuals who invest, as well as the aggregate technological level. A good 
dictator encourages this investment in order to expropriate more. However, the cost of this 
encouragement is that the ensuing higher growth rate will induce earlier democratization. In 
this paper we will illustrate the trade-off between economic benefits from a growth-enhancing 
policy in the short run and the shorter life-time of the dictator in the long run. Furthermore, 
we will find that the higher the return from private investments is the less likely the dictator 
will be a good one. Contrary to McGuire and Olson (1996) we find that a long life-time does 
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1. Introduction 
 
Economists have realized the importance of political institutions in shaping economic 
performance. Most academic studies of political economy (e.g. Shepsle and Weingast 1995, 
Cox 1997, Persson and Tabellini 2000, 2003) focus on the democratic political system, where 
formal political institutions, such as the constitution, the rule of law, and the election system, 
are already well advanced. However, few studies shed light on dictatorship, although most 
people on earth live in such regimes.
1 A puzzling phenomenon in dictatorial economies is that 
they can achieve dramatically different economic growth rates. While East Asian dragons 
have grown 8-10% per year for almost 30 years, many African countries suffered from 




A simple comparison between East Asian dragons and African or South American dictators 
implies that the behavior of autocracies might be important for the fortune of nations.
3 The 
good dictator invests in public education and infrastructure, establishes the rule of law to 
encourage private investment, subsidizes R&D, and so on. However, the bad one simply 
transfers a large fraction of social wealth to herself.
4 Here, the good dictator invests more in 
public projects than the bad, although both are willing to expropriate citizens. It is of interest 
to ask why some dictators are good and others are bad.
5  
 
This question is important for economists, because the type of dictator determines the kind of 
economic performance observed. It is also important for politicians, since good economic 
performance induces early democratization, according to the Lipset/Aristotle hypothesis,
6 
which states that prosperity stimulates democracy. Although the impact of democracy on 
                                                 
1 Recent works in this line include e.g. Wintrobe (1998), Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), Acemoglu (2003) and 
Acemoglu et al. (2004a).   
2 The study of East Asia, see Collins and Bosworth 1996; the study of Africa, see Easterly and Levine 1997. 
3 For formal research on the relationship between the political institution and economic growth, see Acemoglu et 
al. (2004b), and Glaeser et al. (2004). 
4 One classic case of dictator is Mobutu Sese Seko in the Democratic Republic of the Congo from 1965 to 1997. 
According to Acemoglu et al. (2004a), in the 1970s, 15-20 percent of the operating budget of the state went 
directly to Mobutu. In 1977 Mobutu’s family took 71 million USD from the National Bank for personal use and 
by the early 1980s his personal wealth was estimated at 5 billion USD. In 1980, GDP of Congo is only 14.7 
billion USD according to the databank of UN. 
5 Sah Raaj K. (1991) believes that dictatorship is a risky investment.  
6 We owe this terminology to Barro 1999.    3
economic performance is far from reaching a consensus among economists,
7 the  reverse 
causality--the Lipset/Aristotle hypothesis--has shown strong empirical regularity in many 
empirical studies (e.g. Barro 1999, Boix and Stokes 2003).  
 
The present article assumes a dichotomic world, where democracy is defined by the one-
person-one-vote majority voting system (Huntington 1991, Schumpeter 1947) and 
dictatorship (or autocracy, or non-democracy, we treat all as equal for simplicity) means that 
one person holds all political power. We provide a theoretical model to illustrate underlying 
determinants of a dictators’ behavior. Furthermore, we emphasize the trade-off faced by the 
dictator between economic benefits from a growth-enhancing policy in the short run and the 
shorter life-time of a dictator due to earlier democratization, which is induced by economic 
growth in the long run. This simple model is based on three important components. 
 
First, we argue that economic growth is generated by decentralized investment. Individuals’ 
investment increases their private productivity. This private investment has a positive external 
effect on the aggregate technology level. The more individuals invest, the higher the 
aggregate technology level.  
 
Second, consistent with the literature, we assume that the political power affects economic 
performance through the redistribution policy. The redistribution policy in the current model 
is summarized by a two-dimensional vector, which consists of the tax rate and the social 
transfer. A Dictator can invest in public education, infrastructure or provide direct subsidies to 
individuals. All of them can be considered as the social transfer, which encourages individuals 
to invest. Following individuals’ production, a dictator sets the tax rate and collects tax 
revenue. Hence, the tax rate represents the expropriation level and the social transfer policy 
measures the goodness of the dictator. Since we assume taxation follows production the 
promise to reduce the tax rate in a dictatorship isn’t credible
8. This assumption simplifies the 
analysis and enables us to concentrate on the key question of this paper: Why do some 
dictators transfer more to citizens, thereby inducing higher growth rates, while others concern 
                                                 
7 Barro (1997) points out that there is a non-linear relation between democracy and economic growth. Whereas 
democracy is growth enhancing in the young period, it is bad for further economic growth when democracy 
exceeds beyond a certain point. 
8  According to Acemoglu (2000), democratization is the strategic decision of political elites to prevent 
revolution. As long as elites hold political power, the citizen can not trust that elites will undergo a pro-citizen 
redistribution for ever. Hence, citizens would like to revolt if the revolution condition is satisfied. For the elite, it 
is better to democratize when she faces the risk of revolution. I follow his idea and assume that the expropriation 
is after the private investment. Hence, the promise to reduce the expropriation is incredible, as long as the 
dictatorship does not change.     4
themselves more with their own consumption and thus less social transfer. A dictator 
implements a social transfer policy to encourage private investment, because she can 
expropriate more, if citizens invest more. In the short run this is the economic benefit from a 
growth-enhancing policy.   
 
Third, democracy is growth-enhancing in the current model, because it protects decentralized 
investment from expropriative taxation. Hence, it is better than any dictatorship under 
scrutiny.
9  In a dictatorship, the higher the aggregate technology level, the greater the 
expropriated income is. In turn, citizens have greater incentives of political transition. 
Nevertheless, the ruler impedes this political transition because the loss of political power 
coincides simultaneously with the loss of economic benefits. A good dictator encourages 
higher private investments, thereby inducing a higher aggregate technology level in the future. 
Consequently, democracy is more attractive to citizens. It leads to earlier democratization, 
which constitutes the cost to a good dictator. 
 
We find that the dictator is good if the highest tax rate is sufficiently high and the return rate 
of private investment is sufficiently low. The goal of the dictator to foster economic growth is 
to expropriate more in future. If the highest tax rate is great enough, the dictator expects to 
expropriate more. Hence, she is faced with a large incentive to become good. On the other 
hand, if the return rate of private investment is higher (e.g., because of more oil or other 
natural resources), then the initial investment level is higher. Hence, the dictator has lower 
incentives to encourage private investment. In this sense, oil and other natural resources have 
a negative effect on the behavior of a dictator.  
 
Contrary to McGuire and Olson (1996), we point out that the longer life-time does not always 
give the dictator the incentive to do better. Their paper considers only the benefit of public 
investment (similar to our social transfer), whereas my paper emphasizes the trade-off 
between economic benefits in the short run and the shorter life-time in the long run. If citizens 
face a higher revolution cost, i.e., the dictator can live longer, then her positive social transfer 
policy can generate more benefits for her, in turn, she has a higher incentive to be a good one. 
This is the argument of McGuire and Olson (1996). Furthermore, by recognizing this effect, 
we point out, that her positive social transfer will induce a higher economic growth rate in the 
long run, which leads to an earlier revolution. If the dictator has a longer life-time, she will be 
                                                 
9 See Proposition 3, assumption A.2 ensures that democracy is better than a dictatorship in the current model.   5
more concerned with the negative effect of her social transfer policy. Hence, her social 
transfer is not necessarily larger, if she lives longer. 
 
Another novel result is that we illustrate the different effects of good economic performance 
on democratization. If the return rate of the private investment increases due to a new 
discovery of natural resources, such as oil, then more individuals will invest. In turn, the 
country can achieve good economic performance. However, good economic performance 
does not imply inducing sooner democratization, vice versa, citizens have lower incentive to 
revolt and the dictator has also lower incentive to be good. If good economic performance is 
achieved by the higher technology level, then we can observe the Lipset/Aristotle hypothesis. 
Hence, this simple model is consistent not only with respect to the empirical results of Barro 
(1997), but also that of Ross (2001), which finds that oil impedes democracy. 
  
The present paper connects two different strands of the literature. First, the literature of 
political economy studies expropriation and public investment by dictators (e.g., McGuire and 
Olson 1996) facing the potential contest of other political groups (e.g., Tornell and Lane 
1999, Collier 2001, Konrad 2002). However, this literature does not correlate developments in 
a dictatorial nation with potential democratization. The theory of democratization in the 
framework of political economy frequently focuses on the pure redistributive model, for 
instance, Therborn (1977), Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 
2001). However, they don’t distinguish between different dictators in the sense of growth-
enhancing policies. Paul J. Zak and Yi Feng (2003) are more closely related to the current 
paper because they study also the relationship between economic growth and political 
transition. However, they emphasize the acceleration of democratization in different regimes’ 
policies. In contrast to their work, we focus on the condition under which different regimes 
(good or bad) exist. On the other hand, the literature of the new growth theory studies the 
impact of democracy on economic growth, e.g. Barro (1997, 1999) Kurzman, C. et al. (2002), 
or the impact of redistribution policy on growth, e.g. Persson and Tabellini (1994), Benabou 
(1996, 2002), but few consider that the most growth-enhancing policies are implemented by 
dictators in non-democratic societies.   
 
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, I will present the set-up of the model. In section 
3, we study the exogenous growth case without the positive external effect of investments. 
Then we introduce the democratization process in section 4. In section 5, the external effect is   6
investigated, in order to establish the relationship between political transition and economic 
growth. Moreover, we study the behavior of dictators who face the pressure of political 
transition. In section 6, the main results are summarized. 
 
2. The set-up of the model  
 
There are two types of political states: dictatorship and democracy, and two kinds of agents: 
the ruler and citizens. Citizens invest in a project which can increase their productive ability 
and produce output using this ability, whereas the ruler expropriates the output through 
taxation after production in dictatorship. The dictator can choose to be good or bad. The good 
dictator shares a part of the tax income with some citizens, whereas the bad dictator consumes 
all tax revenue by herself. The larger the social transfer from the dictator to citizens, the better 
she is. Democracy is characterized by equality: every citizen has the same political power to 
determine the tax rate and receives the same amount of transfers. 
 
2.1 The economic environment 
 
We consider an infinite horizon economy with two types of agents: a ruler and a continuum 1 
of citizens, which is denoted by  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ i . Citizens live infinitely long, but the ruler could live 
only if she was not killed in democratization, because she represents the political power. Each 
citizen is born with an ability  i ε , which is invariant over time and uniformly distributed over 
the unit interval. Hence,  i i = ε . The citizen is able to produce the final good y  with her 
ability, while the ruler does not produce anything, however she can tax the output of citizens. 
This is the crucial assumption of this paper.
10 It is similar to that of McGuire and Olson 
(1996), where dictatorship impedes the growth of productivity due to expropriation.   
 
The production function of citizen i in period t equals:  
 
                                            
t i I
i t t i N A y λ ε = ,  1 > λ                                                                ( 1 ) 
 
                                                 
10  According to political economy literature, e.g. Benabou 1996, Persson and Tabellini 1994, 2000, non-
democracy means that the rich, who are more productive, have more political power. We argue that this 
assumption describes an imperfect democracy well, but not dictators. This aspect does not apply to dictators such 
as Mobutu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the dictators in Chinese history. They became 
dictators, not because they had higher productivity, but because of their military power in most cases.   7
where  t A  represents the aggregate technology level, N  is natural resources per capita, and  t i I  
is an indicator function of investment in period t.  1 = t i I  means that individual i invests in t, 
whereas  0 = t i I   means that she doesn’t invest. The investment cost is  t eA ,  0 > e , and it 
enables the investor to increase her productivity by the factor λ . Hence, the return rate of 





. If her return rate is greater than 1, then she 
invests. This assumption implies that the private investment decision of individual i depends 
on her own productivity  i ε , but not the aggregate technology level. The investment fully 
depreciates within one period. Hence, a citizen needs to invest in each period if investment is 
valuable to her. Since we assumed a uniform distribution of productivity, there exists a 
threshold, which is denoted by ε ˆ, i.e., individuals with ability lower than ε ˆ do not invest, 
while others with ability higher than ε ˆ invest. Hence, the investment ratio is  ε ˆ 1− . In section 
3, investment has no effect on  t A , because economic growth is assumed to be exogenous. In 
section 5, we assume that investment has a positive external effect on the aggregate 
technology level. As a result, long run economic growth is endogenous.   
 
2.2 The political environment 
 
The political institution is defined by the vector ( ) s , τ
11. The tax rate τ  lies  between 
[] 1 , , 0 < τ τ   and the social transfer s   is financed through taxation.  1 < τ  reflects  the 
sustenance level. Otherwise all citizens would revolt, because they have nothing left after 
taxation. For simplicity two extreme cases are considered: dictatorship and democracy. We 
assume that the initial political state is dictatorship, where the ruler can choose the tax rate 
and decide how to distribute the tax revenue. The bad dictator consumes the entire tax income 
alone, i.e.,  i si ∀ = 0 . However, the good dictator shares the benefit with some citizens 
through social transfer, i.e.,  0 ≥ i s , for some  0 , > i s i , which is named the group-specific 
social transfer. The higher the social transfer is from the dictator to citizens, the better she is. 
The dictatorship is characterized by the degree of expropriation, which level is measured by 
                                                 
11  This assumption comes directly from Lee (2003). To describe the difference between dictatorship and 
democracy he uses two variables, i.e., participation bias and redistribution bias. However, he does not consider 
the commitment problem. Hence, both of them are determined simultaneously in his model.  This assumption is 
also consistent with Persson and Tabellini (2000). In their book (chapter 14), the taxation of capital income and 
the public investment in infrastructures are two policy instruments, which naturally affect private rates of return 
on investment, and in turn, economic performance. However, they study their effects in different models and do 
not consider group-specific public investment.    8
the tax rate. Both the good and bad dictators expropriate citizens. The dictator is good in the 
sense that her redistribution policy ( 0 ≥ i s , for some  0 , > i s i ) is growth-enhancing.  
 
In a democracy, there is no ruler and the tax rate is determined by all citizens through a “one-
person-one-vote” majority voting system, where every agent gets the same transfer 
i s s
dem
i ∀ = , . We assume that social transfer in a democracy is not group-specific, not because 
in reality there is no group-specific social transfer in the democratic society (in general, all 
social transfers are considered to be group-specific), but because the nature of democracy is 
such that everybody is treated equally. Hence, although the individual project, which is 
financed by the democratic government, could be group-specific, in the aggregate, the 
democratic government concerns itself with the interests of all citizens, and the social transfer 
is more equally distributed among individuals than under a dictator. Furthermore, allowing 
group-specific social transfers in democracy would complicate our analysis of democracy, 
whereas the current article focuses on the non-democracy. Allowing group-specific social 
transfer in democracy does not qualitatively change our results concerning dictatorial 
behavior.
12  In fact, different majorities of citizens could support different group-specific 
social transfer schemes in democracy. Finally, everybody obtains the same a priori.  
 
In order to change the political state (through revolution or democratization, here, both are 
same), citizen i has to pay  i P  for a weapon. Contrary to a dictator, citizens pay a constant 
cost  c   in the aggregate during the revolution. This cost of revolution could be either 
considered as the destroyed income in turmoil (Acemoglu 2001), or reflect the cooperation 
and/or coordination problem among a large scale of citizens. The cooperation problem among 
citizens has been modeled in details in some papers, e.g., Acemoglu et al. (2004a). The ruler 
acts by herself. Hence, she has no such problem. If the revolution is successful, the ruler dies. 
As a result, the ruler always tries to prevent the revolution. She also buys the weapon in order 
to repress the revolution. For simplicity, we assume the price of weapon to be fixed and the 
same for all. Whether the revolution can succeed depends on who possesses more weapons. 
This political transition is modeled by a sequential game. The citizens move first, the ruler 
then reacts. We assume that the ruler moves later, in order to reflect the advantage of holding 
political power. She can adjust the expenditure on weapons according to the revolution 
                                                 
12 Appendix 2 shows that democracy is even better, if we allow that in democracy, social transfer is only given to 
the individual who invests. Then the citizens have higher incentive to revolt. Our result that the dictator faces a 
trade-off when she implements a positive social transfer policy has no qualitative change.     9
decision of citizens. However, the reverse timing does not change the timing of revolution, 
but the actual weapon expenditures of citizens and the ruler in political transition. The current 
model focuses on the behavior of the ruler in dictatorship, hence, the time of revolution, in 
turn, the life time of the dictator is the key issue. The actual expenditure of weapons in 
revolution does not affect the social transfer policy of the dictator. 
 
2.3 The timing 
 
Upon birth all citizens realize their abilities, and other exogenous parameters ( e , , λ τ ) are 
revealed. It is a finite repeated game between the ruler and a continuum of citizens until 
revolution succeeds. Within every period they play a sequential game, whose timing of events 
can be summarized as follows: 
 
1.  At the beginning of period t , the technology level  t A  is determined either by the 
exogenous factor (section 3), or by the endogenous variables in time  1 − t  (section 5).  
2.  Citizens determine whether or not to undertake a revolution. 
3.  If there is no revolution, or if the revolution is repressed, the ruler can keep her 
political power. Then she decides whether to be a good dictator or not, i.e., to choose 
the scheme of the social transfer ( i s ). The ruler can not observe the individuals’ 
ability, but she can see whether the citizen invests or not.  
4.  If the revolution is successful, the ruler is killed and citizens establish the democratic 
political system.  
5.  After watching the political state and the behavior of the dictator, citizens decide 
whether to invest, i.e., ε ˆ is determined.  
6.  Citizens produce output. 
7.  The tax rate τ  is determined either by the ruler in dictatorship, or by the one-person-
one-vote majority voting system in democracy. The tax revenue is collected and 
citizens receive the remaining output.  
 
We assume that the tax rate is determined after production in order to reflect the idea that 
expropriation is the key property of the dictatorship. The dictator has to expropriate the 
citizens because she holds all political power. Any promise to reduce the expropriation level 
is incredible with regard to the citizens. This concept constitutes the basis of the 
democratization theory of Acemoglu (2000). However, we assume that the social transfer is   10
paid to citizens before production, hence, it is credible. Thus, the prepaid social transfer gives 
the dictator an opportunity to become good.  
 
We assume a perfect capital market with zero interest rate to finance all possible expenditures 
before production. With this crucial assumption the democratization process in the current 
model depends on the expected future income. The more the expropriated income in 
dictatorship compared to that in democracy is, the greater the incentive to democratize is. 
Thus, the current model is consistent with the Lipset/Aristotle hypothesis.  For simplicity, we 
assume that all debts should be cleared at the end of each period. The rest of income is eaten, 
thus, there is no saving. 
 
All agents are risk neutral. Hence, utility can be measured by net income, which is totally 
consumed by agents within the period. Without taking the weapon expenditure into 
consideration, the net income of citizen i at the end of period t is:   
 
                                           t it it t it it eA I s y Y − + − = ) 1 ( τ                                                          ( 2 ) 
 
And the ruler’s net income is:       
 
                                           ∫ − = di s y Y it it t t ruler ) ( , τ                                                                 ( 3 )   
 
In the following sections, we solve for the sub-game perfect equilibrium and analyze 
behavioral determinants of the dictator. According to backward induction, we first discuss the 
economic decision of agents and solve for the income of individuals in each political 
institution. In section 4, we study the political decision whether or not to revolt. 
 
3. The exogenous growth model 
 
3.1 The dictatorship 
 
The initial political institution is dictatorship. We assume that the technology level  t A  grows 
exogenously. In section 4 we will know that the life time of the ruler depends on  t A  (see 
equation 20 and 23), which is the single state variable in this simple model. Since this is a   11
repeated game with finite periods and the tax rate is set after production, the dictator chooses 
τ τ =
dic  regardless of whether she is good or bad. Although the good dictator is willing to 
encourage the citizen to invest, she cannot use the tax rate as the policy tool. As long as she 
holds all political power in her hand and taxation takes place after production, citizens are 
never convinced by the commitment of tax reduction and increase their investment.  
 
Citizens decide whether to invest or not with the expectation that the tax rate will be set at the 
highest level. It is clear that the citizen with the lowest ability ( 0 = i ε ) does not invest 
regardless of the tax rate. We assume that the citizen with the highest ability ( 1 = i ε ) invests 
under the highest tax rate. We then make the following assumption:
13 
 





) 1 ( N
e
                                                                (A.1) 
 
This assumption states that the net benefit of investment for the individual with  1 = i ε  
( ) 1 )( 1 ( τ λ − − N ) is greater than the cost (e), even if she gets no transfer from the dictator. 
I.e., her net return rate of private investment 
e
N ) 1 )( 1 ( τ λ − −
 is greater than 1. Hence, there is 
a citizen with ability  1 ˆ 0 < < ε , who is indifferent between investing and not investing. The 
ruler would like to give the social transfer to citizens if and only if she could encourage 
private investment. It is obvious that the ruler is only willing to pass on the positive social 
transfer to citizens who will invest after receiving this social transfer, because the ruler can 
then benefit from the enlargement of the investment ratio. The social transfer to the non-
investing citizen can not generate any benefit to the ruler. Hence, we model this public 
investment as the group-specific social transfer implemented before the private investment 
decision, i.e.  ε ˆ 0 < = i if sit  and  ε ˆ 0 ≥ > = i if s s t it . We define  S A s t t ≡ , where S  is  the 
steady state ratio of social transfer to technology level. This leads to:
14        
 
                                                 
13 If she invests, her income is  ()t t eA N A − −τ λ 1 . If she doesn’t invest, her income is  () τ − 1 N At . Hence, 
she invests if and only if  () ( ) t t t A N eA N A τ τ λ − > − − 1 1 . After simplifying this condition, we have (A.1). 
14 For  individual  ε ˆ , her income is  ( ) t t t eA s N A − + − ε τ λ ˆ 1 , if she invests. Otherwise, her income is 
() ε τ ˆ 1− N At . Indifference between investing and not investing implies 
() () ε τ ε τ λ ˆ 1 ˆ 1 − = − + − N A eA s N A t t t t . Rearranging this equation, we have (4).   12









                                                            ( 4 ) 
 
The ruler chooses the optimal transfer S  in order to maximize her income: 
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t t i t ruler
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Substitute (4) and recall the assumption that the social transfer is non-negative, we get 
exg S  
from the first-order condition. The second-order condition for a maximum is satisfied. 
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Proposition 1 




















. The dictator is better the higher 
τ   , the lower the level of natural resources and the lower the return rate of private 
investment. 
 
As we assumed previously, the bad ruler consumes all tax income and sets the social transfer 
at  i si ∀ = 0.  
bad ε ˆ , reflecting this threshold in a bad dictatorship, equals to  () () τ λ − − 1 1 N
e
. 










 and substituting from 
bad ε ˆ , 
we have  τ ε < −
bad ˆ 1.  
bad ε ˆ 1−  is the investment ratio in the bad dictatorship, and τ  represents 
the expropriation level. If private investment is not attractive to citizens, i.e., 
bad ε ˆ 1−  is very 
low, the ruler has the incentive to be good encouraging citizens to invest. As expected, if the 
expropriation level declines, the ruler is less likely to be good. Because 
bad ε ˆ 1−  strictly   13
decreases in τ , we have a unique 
∗ τ , so that 
∗ ∗ = − τ τ ε ) ( ˆ 1
bad . For all 
∗ ≤τ τ , the dictator is 
bad, and for all 
∗ >τ τ  she is good. This result implies that the dictator wants to encourage 
private investment, if τ  is high enough, i.e., she can expropriate enough after production. For 
the dictator, the social transfer is similar to an investment, constituting the tax rate as her rate 
of return.   
 
If the condition for being good is satisfied, the good dictator pays a positive social transfer 
good S  to the citizen who will invest. Substituting positive 
good S  in (4), we obtain:  
 
                                       
) 2 )( 1 (








N e good                                                              ( 6 )  
 
The good dictator has two effects for citizens: first, the individual who invests can earn more 
due to the positive social transfer; second, the positive social transfer decreases the entry 
barrier investment, hence, more citizens will invest. (It is easy to see that 
bad good ε ε ˆ ˆ < ) Of 
course the citizen who does not invest can not increase her income in the good dictatorship.  
 











 holds, the transition from the bad to the good dictatorship is a 
Pareto-improving process. More citizens invest, aggregate output increases and all agents 
obtain a higher or at least the same income.  
 
The proposition is easy to prove, since










, and citizens receive a positive social transfer from the ruler. The Pareto-
improving process is achieved, because the transition ensures the income of the good dictator 
to exceed that of the bad dictator. The incomes of the ruler and citizens in the bad and good 
dictatorship in period t are given as follows, respectively: 
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In a democratic society, the tax rate is determined by all citizens through a “one-person-one-
vote” majority voting system. The tax revenue is equally distributed to every citizen.
15 Hence, 
the median voter is the deciding person. She maximizes her income  t Y , 5 . 0 , subject to the 
budget constraint of redistribution: 
 
                                  t
I
t t eA I s N A Y Max 5 . 0 , 5 . 0 ) 1 ( 5 . 0
5 . 0 − + − = τ λ
τ
 
                                  () ² ˆ ² ˆ 5 . 0 . .
1
0 , ε λ λ ε τ τ − + = = ∫ N A di y s t s t t i  
 
There are two cases:  
 
1)  If 5 . 0 ˆ > ε , i.e., the median voter doesn’t invest. Hence, her maximization problem 
reduces to:  
                   ( ) ² ˆ ² ˆ 5 . 0 ) 1 ( 5 . 0 , 5 . 0 ε λ λ ε τ τ
τ
− + + − = N A N A Y t t t Max  
The first order condition is: 
                           0 ) ˆ 1 )( 1 ( 5 . 0 ) ˆ ² ˆ ( 5 . 0 5 . 0
2 2 , 5 . 0 > − − = − + + − =
∂
∂
ε λ ε λ λ ε
τ




Hence   τ τ =
1 , dem . In order to solve 
1 , ˆ
dem ε , we have: 
                           s N A s eA N A invest no Y invest Y t t t t i t i + − = + − − ⇔ = ) 1 ( ˆ ) 1 ( ˆ ) ( ) ( , , τ ε τ ε λ       








e dem                                                                              ( 11 ) 
                                                 
15 In Appendix 2, I will show the case where the tax revenue is only given to the individual who invests.    15
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e dem   holds, democracy decreases inequality (comparing 
(13) and (10)). However, the aggregate output is the same as that of the bad dictatorship. 
 
2)  If   5 . 0 ˆ ≤ ε , the median voter invests. Her maximization problem then becomes: 
                  ( ) t t t t eA N A N A Y Max − − + + − = ² ˆ ² ˆ 5 . 0 ) 1 ( 5 . 0 , 5 . 0 ε λ λ ε τ τ λ
τ
 
The first order condition is: 
                  0 ² ˆ ) 1 ( 5 . 0 ) ˆ ² ˆ ( 5 . 0 5 . 0
2 5 . 0 < − = − + + − =
∂
∂
ε λ ε λ λ ε λ
τ
N A N A N A
Y
t t t    
Hence, 0
2 , =
dem τ  and  0
2 , =
dem s .  
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The aggregate output is as follows: 
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e dem  holds, democracy is capable of increasing aggregate output. 
This is because the tax rate is set at the lowest level. Individuals are encouraged to invest. 
 
The tax rate and the investment ratio in the democratic society depend on the behavior of the 








she supports a higher tax rate (here,  τ τ =
1 , dem ). Therefore, the democratic society suffers also 











i.e., the investment is attractive enough to the median voter, then she would support a lower 
tax rate (here,  0 = τ ). Consequently, the economy enjoys a higher output level due to a higher   16
investment ratio. If 
2
1










, the median voter has two choices. Whether the 
investment is worthwhile to implement depends on her choice of the tax rate. If she decides to 
support a higher tax rate after production, she also knows that the investment is worthless to 
undertake. Hence, she chooses not to invest before production. All other citizens observe her 
investment choice and expect that she will support a higher tax rate after production. Hence, 
the investment ratio is at the lower level. Vice versa, if she would like to invest, then she must 
choose a lower tax rate after investment. Thus, two possible investment ratios and 
redistribution schemes could be achieved:  ) , , ˆ (
1 , 1 , dem dem s τ ε ,  ) 0 , 0 , ˆ (
2 , dem ε . Which one is actually 
chosen by the median voter depends on the parameter constellation. 
 
Proposition 3:  


















democracy can only decrease inequality, but cannot increase  aggregate output.  
2)  In the moderate case of 
2
1










, the impact of democracy is ambiguous 
where two possibilities exist:  ) , , ˆ (
1 , 1 , dem dem s τ ε  and  ) 0 , 0 , ˆ (
2 , dem ε . The median voter is 
willing to choose  ) 0 , 0 , ˆ (
2 , dem ε , if 
2
1
≥ τ . 
 
Proof: The first part is already clear.  The second part is easy to see, if we compare the 
incomes of the median voter in two cases. She will choose  ) 0 , 0 , ˆ (
2 , dem ε , if it generates higher 





dem dem Y Y










τ . Unfortunately, 


























. Thus, the sufficient condition is 
2
1
≥ τ , i.e., the median voter 
will choose  ) 0 , 0 , ˆ (
dem ε  if the highest tax rate is high enough.                                           Q.E.D. 
 
The existence of multiple effects is consistent with the literature of political economy, which 
emphasizes the different effects of democracy on the economic performance. By assuming 
that the majority in a democracy is poor, this literature often argues that democracy hinders 
economic investment due to a higher level of redistribution. On the other hand, democracy   17
also protects against expropriation through the strong rule of law, which is good for economic 
performance. In the current model we argue that both could occur under different 
circumstances. The case of  ) 0 , 0 , ˆ (
2 , dem ε   indicates the positive impact of democracy on 
economic performance, because democracy protects private investments from expropriation. 
On the other hand, the case of  ) , , ˆ (
1 , 1 , dem dem s τ ε  reflects the negative impact of democracy on 
economic growth owing to the high tax rate. However, this negative effect has a different 
economic meaning compared to that of the bad dictatorship  ) 0 , , ˆ ( τ ε
bad . Whereas the former is 
pure redistribution, the latter is pure expropriation. Proposition 3 shows that which case 
occurs in the moderate case depends on parameters, in particular, the highest level of the tax 
rate,  τ . It reflects to what extent the political power is able to influence economic 
performance. If it is large enough (
2
1
≥ τ ), individuals try to avoid redistribution and choose 
the lower tax rate. Hence, democracy has an aggregate effect on economic performance. For 
our purpose, it is more interesting to restrict attention to this case, i.e.  ) 0 , 0 , ˆ (











≥ τ  for simplicity. Combining the above (A.1), we need to make 
the following assumption: 
 










                                                                  (A.2) 
 
We focus on the case where democracy has an aggregate effect on economic performance, 
because only in this case democratization is possible. The pure redistributive democracy 
) , , ˆ (
1 , 1 , dem dem s τ ε  means that the expenditure of the ruler on weapons is more than that of the 
citizen net of the democratization cost.
16 Hence, such “democratization” is impossible. 
 










 and Assumption (A.2), we have: 
 













                                 (A.3) 
 
                                                 
16 For more details, see section 4.   18
This assumption is the sufficient condition of a good democracy in the sense that it has the 
aggregate effect on economic performance, and it also constitutes the condition of a good 
dictatorship. That is why we call it the “goodness” assumption. Since 
good dem ε ε ˆ ˆ
2 , < , the good 
democracy leads to a better economic performance than the good dictatorship. However, 
democratization is a social conflict, while the transition from the bad dictatorship to the good 




In the present paper the process of democratization is modeled as a two stage sequential game 
with perfect information. First the citizen decides whether to revolt, then the ruler decides 
whether to repress. Both revolution and repression require weapons. The citizen attempts to 
undertake a revolution, if she expects a higher level of income could be earned in a 
democratic society. Hence, if necessary, the citizen will offer the difference of her income in 
two political states as the highest payment for the weapon. Similarly, the dictator is willing to 
use her whole income to prevent the possible political transition, because she will lose all in 
the democratic society. Although both are willing to offer the whole life-time income, they 
cannot do so because we assume that the perfect financial market acts well only within one 
period. This assumption simplifies the analysis without loss of generality. Moreover, there is a 
revolution cost c for citizens. Hence, citizens don’t invest in weapons if they expect their 
ruler to invest more than their highest payments in weapons net of the revolutionary cost. If 
they find that the ruler’s income is lower than their highest payment for weapons net of the 
revolution cost, their best choice is to invest in weapons a little more than the ruler’s income. 
Thus we only need to compare the highest payments of both players for weapons, which are 
named the incentive of political transition. Revolution is the best choice for the citizen if and 
only if the citizens’ incentive to revolt net of the revolutionary cost is higher than the 
incentive of the ruler to repress. For simplicity, we assume that the citizen will choose 
revolution when both are equal.  
 
We will consider two possible democratization processes: from the bad dictatorship directly 
to democracy, and from the bad dictatorship indirectly to democracy via the good 
dictatorship.  
 
   19
4.1 The incentive of political transition in the bad dictatorship 
 
The highest payment of citizen i in period t is the difference between incomes in the bad 
dictatorship and the democratic society within t: 
 



















N A eA N A
N A
P
ε ε τ ε
ε ε ε τ ε ε λ
ε ε τ λε
ˆ
) ˆ , ˆ ( ) 1 (
ˆ
,                         ( 17 ) 
 
The first part ( τ λεi tN A ) is the expropriated income of the citizen who invests in both 
political states. The second difference of incomes ( τ ε ε λ i t t i t N A eA N A + − − ) 1 ()  c o m e s  f r o m  
the citizen who invests in democracy but not in the bad dictatorship. The benefit of 
democracy for this group of citizens comes from two sides: the release of the expropriating 
taxation ( τ εi tN A ), and the investment return ( t i t eA N A − − ε λ ) 1 ( ). Finally, the citizen, who 
invests neither in democracy nor the bad dictatorship, saves the tax in democracy ( τ εi tN A ). 
The sum of individual offers net of the revolutionary cost is the citizens’ highest net 
expenditure on weapons. 
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1
0 , , c
N
e A N A t t −
− −
− =




                           ( 18 ) 




















N At                                       ( 19 ) 
 
The difference of payments between the citizen and the dictator determines whether the           
revolution will succeed:  
 












= − = ∆
² 1 1 2
² ²
, , τ λ
τ
                                      ( 20 ) 
 
If  0 ≥ ∆
bad
t , the aggregate highest payment of citizens exceeds that of the ruler. Hence, 
citizens choose revolution and expend a little more on weapons than the highest payment of 
the ruler. The ruler knows the repression will not be successful, thus, the actual repression 
does not occur. If  0 < ∆
bad
t , citizens know that the revolution will be repressed, hence, they   20
don’t choose to revolt. We assume the society begins from the non-democracy. Hence, at the 
beginning period ( 1 = t ), 
bad
1 ∆  is negative. We have the following assumption: 
 









                                      ( A.4 ) 
 
Equation (20) has the following important indications. First, τ   reflects the expropriation 
level. Put differently, the higher τ , the greater the incentive for citizens to seek 
democratization. Second, as most of the political economy literature argues, e.g. the 
Lipset/Aristotle hypothesis, democracy follows the good economic performance. Here, the 
economic growth rate is given by the exogenous growth rate of the aggregate technology level 
t A . With  t A   growing, the benefit from revolution increases. Third, the effects of the 
investment project on the incentive of democratization is demonstrated by the parameters N  
and  e , λ . The more beneficial the project (i.e. the lower e and/or the higher λ  and  N ), the 
lower the incentive to democratize. The first part of equation (20) is from the investment 
return of the “middle class”, who invests in democracy but not in dictatorship, i.e., 
∫ − −
bad




ˆ ) ) 1 ( ( . The citizen of “middle class” has a higher incentive to revolt, if λ  
and  N  increases and/or e declines. However, the size (
dem bad ε ε ˆ ˆ − ) of this group decreases in 
N  and λ . The more beneficial the investment project, the smaller the aggregate effect of 
democracy. Hence, the net social incentive (
bad
t ∆ ) decreases. This relationship between 
economic performance and political transition is possibly supported by the fact that oil 
impedes democratization(e.g., Ross 2001). In this framework, we can argue that a country’s 




) 1 ( − λ
). Hence, the 
size of middle class shrinks. Such societies have a lower incentive to democratize.  
 
Proposition 4:  
In the bad dictatorship, the incentive of democratization increases in the technology level  t A,  
and decreases in the natural resource N . The higher the expropriation level τ , the greater is 
the incentive of revolution. The net social incentive of democratization decreases in the return 
of the investment project and increases in its cost e. 
   21
Comparing this result to Proposition 1, we find that the impact of τ ,  N  and the return rate of 
the private investment on democratization is similar to that on the behavior of the bad 
dictator. If the highest tax rate increases, the bad dictator faces an increasing risk of revolution 
according to Proposition 4, and intuitively, she also has a larger incentive to become good 
according to Proposition 1.  
                       
4.2 The incentive of political transition in the good dictatorship 
 
For the good dictator the positive social transfer increases tax revenues. Hence, she also has 
more incentives to prevent the revolution than the bad dictator: 
 
                                        
) 2 )( 1 ( 2









e N A N A
P
t t good
t ruler                                               ( 21 ) 
 
The democratization incentive of citizens is as follows: 
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,                              ( 22 ) 
 
The poor who don’t invest in both political states suffer the expropriative taxation in the 
dictatorship. Hence, she prefers to undertake revolution. Here, we model this as a positive 
payment  τ εi tN A  for weapons. For the middle class who invest in democracy but not in the 
good dictatorship, they support democratization, because they can earn more in democratic 
society
17. However, a priori, it is unclear whether the rich, who invest both in the good 
dictatorship and democracy, support democracy or not. If their payment for political transition 
good
i t s N A − τ λε   is negative, they can earn more in the good dictatorship and become the 





                                                 
17  0 ] ˆ ) 1 ( [ ] ) 1 ( [ ) 1 ( > − + − > − + − = + − − e N A e N A N A eA N A
dem
t i t i t t i t ε τ λ ε τ λ τ ε ε λ    22
Proposition 5:  
The citizen with the highest ability 1 always supports democracy, whereas some of the rich, 
who invest both in the good dictatorship and democracy, could support the dictatorship under 
certain conditions. 
 
Proof: see Appendix 1. 
 
This Proposition indicates that the dictator can extend the social support of the regime by 
means of a positive social transfer. Surprisingly, the group which possibly supports the regime 
is not the one with the highest ability, but a group with a relatively lower ability, although 
their ability great enough to let them invest in both dictatorship and democracy. In this sense, 
the “top rich” do not sympathize with the good dictator. 
 




t citizen − =∫
1
0 , ,   and the net social incentive of democratization of the whole 
society is: 
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Proposition 6:  
1) In the good dictatorship, the incentive of democratization increases in the aggregate 
technology level. The higher the expropriation level, the less the incentive of revolution is. 
The net social incentive of democratization increases in natural resources and the return of 
the investment project and decreases in its cost. 
2) Because of Pareto-improving social transfer the incentive of democratization in the good 
dictatorship is lower than in the bad one. 
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Comparing to Proposition 4, it is of interest to see that the effects of investment and the tax 
rate on the incentive to revolt differ between the bad and good dictatorship. Analogously, the 
first term of (23) is also from the investment return of the “middle class”, i.e., 
∫ − −
good




ˆ ) ) 1 ( ( . The size (
dem good ε ε ˆ ˆ − ) of this group increases, if N  and  λ  
increases and/or e declines. Hence, the net social incentive (
good
t ∆ ) increases. In other words, 
this model predicts that natural resources accelerate democratization in the good dictatorship. 
This, however, requires future empirical evidence. In the good dictatorship, taxation is the 
mixture of redistribution and expropriation. The increase of the highest tax rate implies that 
social support of the dictatorship could widen. Hence, the incentive for democratization 
declines.  
 
Proposition 6 strengthens Proposition 1. An increase in the highest tax rate gives rise to a 
higher incentive for the dictator to be good, because she can expropriate more. Furthermore, 
the good dictator faces a smaller danger of revolution if the highest tax rate increases. 
Analogously, if the private investment is more profitable, the dictator has less incentive to be 
good, and the good dictator faces a larger possibility of revolution.    
  
Improvement of the citizen’s income due to the positive social transfer decreases their 
incentive to change the political state, whereas the good dictator resists the democratization 
more than the bad one because of the higher economic benefit. Hence, given the technology 
level, we argue that the opportunity of democratization decreases in the economic 
performance during the transition from the bad dictatorship to the good. However, it does not 
directly contradict the Lipset/Aristotle hypothesis. As we have seen, if the economy grows 
with the technology level, the society has a higher incentive to become a democracy. In the 
following section, we consider the external effect of the individual’s investment on the 
aggregate technology level and demonstrate that the technology progress enlarges the income 
difference between dictatorship and democracy.  
  
5.  External Effect and Endogenous Growth 
 
So far we have assumed that the aggregate technology level, as well as the long run economic 
growth, is given exogenously. The dictator is good if she finds that the positive social transfer 
can increase her instantaneous income. In other words, we have assumed that the behavior of   24
the dictator can affect short run economic performance, but not long run economic growth. 
Now we introduce endogenous technological progress to our simple model. As is standard in 
endogenous growth theory,
18  the aggregate technology level and, in turn, the economic 
growth rate, increases in the investment ratio  ε ˆ 1− . We assume for simplicity that private 
investment has a positive externality on the aggregate technology level, i.e., 
)) ˆ ( 1 ( 1 1 − − + = t t t G A A ε , where  ) ˆ ( 1 − t G ε   is the growth rate of the aggregate technology level, 









t . Hence, the growth rate of  t A  is 
the increasing function of the social transfer in period  1 − t , denoted by  ) ( )) ( ˆ ( 1 1 1 − − − ≡ t t t S g S G ε , 
where 0 ) ( 1 > ′ − t S g . This is the single linkage across periods. According to the assumption that 
financial markets are perfect only within a period, no income can be transferred across 
periods. From equations (20) and (23) we know that the higher growth rate of technology 
level leads to a sooner political transition. Hence, there could be a tradeoff for the ruler 
between a greater benefit in the short run and relatively faster democratization in the long run. 
From now on, we standardize  1 = N  for simplicity.  
 
As the growth rate is endogenous, all individuals know the life-time of the dictator, which is 
the first period with a non-negative  t ∆ . The dictator sets the tax rate on τ . As we know from 
(20) and (23),          
 
  ∫ − − − = ∆
dic




ˆ ) ) 1 ((                                                ( 24 ) 
 
In order to make the analysis tractable, we consider a three-period model in this section. We 
assume that the revolution takes place in the third period. According to (24), it implies  0 3 > ∆  
for any  1 S  and  2 S . Hence, the sufficient and necessary condition for  0 3 > ∆  is: 
 









dem i > − − + ∫
ε
ε ε λ                                            ( A.5 ) 
 
                                                 
18  There are two main approaches to model the role of human capital in economic growth: Lucas (1988) 
emphasizes the externality of human capital in production; Nelson and Phelps (1966), Romer (1990), Grossman 
and Helpman (1991), and Aghion and Howitt (1992) argue that the human capital will induce more innovation or 
let the economy accept new technology.    25










exg S   is the optimal social transfer in the exogenous growth 
model, as shown in (5). This condition means that revolution will take place in the third 
period, even if the ruler sets the social transfer at the lowest level (i.e.,  0 = S ) in the first two 
periods. Hence, the dictator knows that the second period is her last period. Then she acts the 
same as in the exogenous growth model, i.e., she maximizes her instantaneous income. Thus, 
exg S S = 2 . What we want to show here is the social transfer in the first period  1 S . This is the 
social transfer in the endogenous growth model. In period 1, the dictator is aware of two 
effects of her social transfer policy. First, her transfer can encourage more citizens to invest, 
and in turn, increase her income in period 1. Secondly, more investment implies the higher 
technology level in the second period, and in turn, will render the revolution more likely in 
period 2. If the revolution takes place in the second period, then the first period is the last 
period for the dictator. Hence, the life-time income of the ruler is given as follows: 
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where 1 0 ≤ ≤ ρ  is the discount factor. We define a threshold value 
r S1  so that  0 ) ( 1 2 = ∆
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Hence, for all 
r S S 1 1 > , revolution occur in the second period. The ruler knows that. Hence, 
she chooses 
exg S  in the first period. For all 
r S S 1 1 ≤ , the dictator can live for two periods. 
Hence, she chooses  ) ), ( ( ) ( max arg max arg 1 2 2 , 1 1 , 1 1
exg
ruler ruler S S A Y S Y V S ρ + = =
∗ , subject to 
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ρ .  Sum up,  { } 1 1 1 ˆ , min S S S
r =
∗ . Because 
exg S  is the optimal 










exg S S > 1 ˆ . 
We define  1
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exg S Y S g S Y ρ ρ − − = . Hence, if  1 1
~
S S
r < , then the dictator sets   26
exg S S = 1   and lives for one period. This social transfer decision of the dictator in the 
endogenous growth model is shown in Figure 1 and summarized in Proposition 7.  
 
Proposition 7 
In the endogenous growth model, the dictator chooses the social transfer as follows: 
1)  In the last period of her life-time, the dictator acts the same as in the exogenous 
growth model. 
2)  In the period before, the dictator sets  { } S S S
r ˆ , min =
∗ . 
r S  increases in the revolution 
cost c and decreases in the initial technology level  1 A .  
3)  { } S S S
r ˆ , min =
∗  could be smaller than 
exg S.   
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Figure 1 Social transfer in relation to the life-time income of the dictator 
 
The effect of  
1 A
c
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) ) 1 (( )) 0 ( 1 ( , the first period is the last period for the 
dictator, thus, 
exg S S = 1 . When 
1 A
c
 exceeds this threshold value, the dictator could live for 
two periods. However, she isn’t willing to live such a long time as long as  1 1
~
S S
r < , because 
living for two periods implies that she has to set the social transfer so low that her life-time 
income of two periods is even smaller than that of one period. In this case, the dictator would   27




further so that  1 1
~
S S
r ≥ , the ruler can and is willing to live for two periods. Then she chooses 
{ } S S S
r ˆ , min =
∗ . However, it does not mean directly that her social transfer is greater than 
exg S . Whether 
∗ S  is greater than 
exg S  depends on 
1 A
c
. If  
1 A
c
 is not so big, 
r S  could be 
smaller than 
exg S .  According to McGuire and Olson (1996), the longer the ruler’s life-time 
is, the higher is her incentive to be good. Here, we show that it is also possible for the ruler to 
be worse, when her life-time increases. The reason is that she wants to keep her longer life-
time, and is concerned more with the negative effect of her social transfer policy in the long 
run. This relationship is shown in the following figure. 
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In the current paper we discussed the determinants of the dictator’s incentive to be good in the 
sense that she would like to share the tax income with certain citizens. We emphasized two 
important effects of private investment in production: the individual effect which improves 
private output, and the positive externality on the aggregate technological level. We find that   28
the dictator is more likely to be good if the individual faces a less profitable investment 
project. The dictator’s incentive to be good is to expropriate more through encouraging 
citizens to invest more. Possible evidence is the gradual process of Chinese reform, in which 
regions and sectors reform one after another. For the local government, the investment from 
the central government in its region could be seen as a “natural resource”, because the local 
government can use it free of charge. The less it is, the lower is the return rate of private 
investment, in turn, the lower the investment ratio. Hence, the local government, who is far 
away from the economic center in the old system, has a higher incentive to encourage private 
investment. Chinese reform began from the agricultural sector, where the central government 
invested nothing in the command economy. Moreover, the agriculture reform began from the 
poor province, Anhui. The nowadays fast growing provinces, e.g., Zhejiang, Fujian, 
Guangdong, are all less developed areas in the old system. Northeast China, where is the 
economic center of the old system and attracted the most investment from the central 
government, is in recession now. Our finding does not directly contradict the study of Laffont 
and Qian (1999), where they argued that the necessary condition of reform in one sector is 
that the private return of investment in this sector is large enough to compensate the rent of 
government in the old system. We argue that the ruler would prefer to choose the sector with 
a lower private rate of return, if there are several sectors satisfying the necessary condition.    
 
After endogenizing the growth rate, we find two different effects of economic performance on 
democratization. The good dictatorship is capable of reducing the incentive of a revolution 
through increasing the citizens’ investment ratio and their income, but it is also possible to 
lead to an earlier democratization given higher economic growth rates. The effect of the 
revolutionary costs on the behavior of the ruler is non-linear. As a consequence long life-time 
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In order to determine the political attitude of this group of citizens, we should check whether 
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Hence, the citizen with ability 1 always supports democracy. 
 
For the person with ability 
good ε ˆ , the payment is: 
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Appendix 2: 
 
One reason to assume an equally distributed social transfer in democracy is that, we cannot 
know a priori who constitutes the majority. Theoretically, 50% of the population plus one 
individual could make up the majority, who support the social transfer policy only benefiting 
them. However, some may doubt whether the result of this paper is sensitive to the 
assumption of equally distributed social transfer in a democracy. This appendix shows us that 
the result of my paper doesn’t change qualitatively, if we assume that the social transfer   30
policy in a democracy is same as that in dictatorship, i.e., the individual who invests gets 
social transfer. 
 
Since my model is based on a trade-off between the short run benefit and long run costs for 
the dictator, we need to show that citizens, in the aggregate, still have incentives to revolt 
under the new group-sepecific social transfer policy. I.e., democracy is still better than a 
dictatorship. 
 
Analogously, the median vote maxmizes her income.  
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If 5 . 0 ˆ > ε , i.e., the median voter doesn’t invest, her maximization problem reduces to:   
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If   5 . 0 ˆ ≤ ε , the median voter invests. Her maximization problem is then: 
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The first order condition is:                  0





   
Hence,  τ τ =
2 , dem  and  0
2 , >
dem s . Because there is no expropriation, the individual who 
invests gets more social transfer in a democracy than in a dictatorship. Thus, 
good dem ε ε ˆ ˆ
2 , < .                             
          
Summarizing, in a democracy the investment ratio is always greater than in a dictatorship. 
I.e., the citizens in aggregate can earn more in democracy. Hence, they are willing to revolt if 
possible. The dictator must face the trade-off between the short run economic benefit and the 
earlier democratization in the long run. Our result would not change qualitatively.   31
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